In this issue, Swart et al. (2009) provide a useful review of how uncertainty has been treated in the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and how this treatment has evolved over time. They also recommend a series of improvements for future IPCC assessments, with which I am substantially in agreement. In this essay, I will emphasize three points on how to communicate uncertainty through the IPCC process.
objects of study), adds a complication to socioeconomic analysis that does not exist in physical systems. Aside from that issue, however, the distinction blurs. The lack of global uniform coverage of earth observation systems results in the necessity of data reanalysis, based on reasonable but nevertheless subjective assumptions.
One example of this phenomenon is the record of ocean temperatures over the 20 th century at depth. The ocean temperature data assembled by Levitus et al. (2005) has been reanalyzed by several different authors (e.g., Gouretski and Koltermann 2007; Domingues et al. 2008 ) making alternative plausible assumptions about how to correct for observational errors and instrument bias. The resulting trends in ocean warming have a significant impact on whether and how one can constrain future projections of global mean temperature because of their implications for the rate heat uptake by the deep ocean (Sokolov et al. 2008) .
The point here is that subjectivity of assumptions is a necessary part of assessment across all disciplines that are relevant to climate change. IPCC assessments that attempt to characterize and communicate uncertainty must combine expert elicitation and other "subjective" measures of uncertainty with seemingly precise uncertainty ranges from data sets or model simulations.
One example from the 4th Assessment Report (AR4) is instructive here. The WG I Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of AR4 describes the uncertainty in a rise in sea level of between 18 and 59 cm by the year 2100 (IPCC 2007a), which is a "modelbased range" composed largely of thermal expansion of oceans, melting of nonpolar glaciers, and the gradual response of ice sheets. The range does not include the potential for increasing contributions from rapid dynamic processes in the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets (WAIS), which have already had a significant effect on sea level over the past 15 years and could eventually raise sea level by many meters. Lacking such processes, models cannot fully explain observations of recent sea-level rise, and accordingly, projections based on such models may seriously understate potential future increases (Oppenheimer et al. , 2008 . Although the AR4 WG I SPM recognizes the possibility of a larger ice-sheet contribution, its main quantitative results indicate the opposite: Uncertainty in sea-level rise is smaller, and its upper bound is lower, for the twenty-first century than was indicated in the Third Assessment Report (IPCC 2001) .
Given recent concern over the current generation ice sheet models, it is understandable why the authors would give a numerical uncertainty range that omits WAIS and Greenland. However, this approach of restricting uncertainty statements, especially in the SPM, can have disastrous unintended consequences. In a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal, Lomborg writes that "The United Nations science consensus expects temperature increases of 3 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century, leading to (for example) sea-level increases of between one-half and two feet. Yet such a rise is entirely manageable and not dissimilar to the sealevel rise of about one foot we dealt with over the past 150 years." (Lomborg 2008 ). This deeply misleading conclusion is unfortunately completely defensible given the numerical range in the AR4 SPM.
It is important to note that WG II reached a strikingly different conclusion regarding the uncertainty in sea level rise in its SPM than did WG I (Schneider et al. 2007) . WG II includes the statement that, "There is medium confidence that at least partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet, and possibly the West Antarctic ice sheet, would occur over a period of time ranging from centuries to millennia for a global average temperature increase of 1-4
• C (relative to [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] , causing a contribution to sea level rise of 4-6 m or more." (IPCC 2007b) . The presence of this statement in WG I and of a qualitative compromise statement in the overall synthesis report are not sufficient to prevent the misinterpretation of the WG I uncertainty range.
My third and final point, therefore, is that future IPCC assessments must be even more thorough about informing numerical uncertainty ranges with multiple sources of that uncertainty, not limiting them to available models, and for making these sources as transparent as possible. However well-meaning, attempts to define consistent words for likelihood judgment consumed much time in previous assessment rounds, and in the end evidence has shown that readers define their meaning anyway (Patt and Schrag 2003; Patt and Dessai 2005) . Where future IPCC efforts need to be focused is on making sure that all sources of uncertainty have been included and reflected in the numerical ranges on which public discourse will inevitably focus. The consistency that is needed across chapters and across working groups is not that about specific words, but about the paradigmatic approach to uncertainty and risk management. Despite the legitimate differences between disciplines, a shared view of the relative importance of avoiding type I vs. type II errors is both achievable and critically important.
In the past two decades, the IPCC's emphasis on consensus was necessary, and has served to help shift public opinion. Going forward, governments now need careful assessments of the relative risks of impacts and costs. Treatment of uncertainty will become more important than consensus if the IPCC is to stay relevant to the decisions that face us.
